KHARTOUM, Sudan – As Sudan endures a devastating conflict that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced millions, international attention increasingly focuses on the complex web of foreign powers whose involvement is widely seen as fueling the protracted crisis. What began in April 2023 as a power struggle between two military factions has metastasized into a proxy battle, drawing in a diverse array of global and regional actors whose strategic interests often overshadow the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the Horn of Africa. The question looms large: could these external forces, whose support often prolongs the fighting, instead be instrumental in stopping the bloodshed?
The war, now in its second year, pits the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. This internal struggle erupted from a fragile transition following the 2019 overthrow of long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir and a subsequent 2021 military coup. The conflict has resulted in one of the world's most dire humanitarian emergencies, with over 150,000 people killed and more than 12 million displaced, constituting the largest displacement crisis globally. Reports of famine, widespread disease outbreaks like cholera, and a near-total collapse of the healthcare system paint a grim picture. Both sides stand accused of egregious human rights violations, with the RSF, which originated from the notorious Janjaweed militias, particularly implicated in war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and potential genocide in Darfur. Recent territorial shifts, including the SAF's recapture of Khartoum in March 2025 and the RSF's seizure of El Fasher in October 2025, granting it control over all of Darfur, suggest a potential de facto partition of the country.
A Battlefield of Geopolitical Interests
The conflict in Sudan is far from an isolated domestic affair; it is significantly shaped by the extensive involvement of over a dozen foreign countries from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. These external actors are driven by a mix of geopolitical ambitions, economic gains, and regional rivalries, often prioritizing their own strategic objectives over a peaceful resolution for Sudan.
On one side, the Sudanese Armed Forces have received support from nations such as Egypt, motivated by concerns over Nile water security and regional stability, and eager to counterbalance the influence of other powers. Saudi Arabia, despite hosting peace talks, has also been identified as a SAF supporter. Turkey has bolstered the SAF's air capabilities, reportedly supplying Bayraktar drones, while Qatar is also aligned with the army. Notably, Iran has reportedly provided drones and surveillance systems to the SAF in exchange for access to a Red Sea naval base, expanding its naval reach into a critical waterway. Russia, initially backing the RSF, shifted its allegiance to the SAF by mid-2024, seeking assurances for a naval base at Port Sudan.
Conversely, the Rapid Support Forces have benefited significantly from the backing of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is accused of providing substantial financial aid and military supplies to the RSF, often through complex supply chains, including reports of arms being delivered under the guise of humanitarian aid. This support is reportedly linked to the UAE's regional ambitions and economic interests, particularly the lucrative trade in Sudanese gold, which is allegedly smuggled to Dubai. Ethiopia and Eritrea have also been identified as supporters of the RSF. The Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary organization, initially provided weapons and training to the RSF in exchange for gold mining concessions before Russia's strategic shift. This foreign interference has not only intensified the fighting but also provided both warring parties with the resources and legitimacy to prolong their campaigns, exacerbating the human toll.
Fragmented Diplomacy and Eroding Aid
Despite the escalating violence, international mediation efforts have largely proven ineffective, characterized by a lack of coordination and insufficient political will from both the warring factions and their external backers. Numerous attempts at negotiation, including talks held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland, as well as initiatives by the United Nations, African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have failed to secure lasting ceasefires or address the conflict's underlying causes. The primary reasons for this diplomatic stalemate include the warring parties' continued military and financial aid from external sponsors, a focus on short-term ceasefires rather than comprehensive solutions, and a perceived lack of impartiality among mediators. Disagreements among international facilitators, such as the cancellation of the "Quad" talks (involving the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE) in July 2025 due to disputes over the post-war political order, further highlight the challenges.
Adding to the crisis, humanitarian access remains severely constrained. Both the Sudanese government and the RSF have been accused of obstructing aid delivery, deliberately delaying permits and hindering efforts to reach affected populations. The situation is compounded by a significant decline in international humanitarian funding. Major donors, including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Switzerland, have scaled back their aid commitments. By March 2025, only 6% of the UN's humanitarian appeal for Sudan had been met, leaving millions without essential food, water, medical care, and shelter. This reduction in aid, coupled with the obstruction of relief efforts, has pushed Sudan to the brink of the world's largest famine.
A Critical Juncture for Peace
The current trajectory of the Sudan conflict underscores a profound moral and practical imperative for foreign powers to fundamentally reassess their roles. The extensive external interference, driven by self-interest and a struggle for influence, is directly prolonging the violence and deepening the humanitarian catastrophe. The "real problem arises when these interests, mostly economic, geostrategic and geopolitical, are placed above the humanitarian costs of war," turning Sudan into a live laboratory for global militarism where local populations bear the brunt.
Ending the conflict necessitates a concerted and unified international effort, moving beyond fragmented diplomatic initiatives and self-serving proxy support. This requires external powers to actively cease the flow of arms and financial resources to both the SAF and RSF, exerting genuine pressure for a negotiated settlement. A more robust and impartial mediation process, backed by unified international leverage, is crucial to compel the warring parties towards a sustainable peace that prioritizes civilian governance. Moreover, greater support and recognition for local, grassroots initiatives, such as the Emergency Response Rooms run by Sudanese volunteers, which provide essential services in areas inaccessible to larger organizations, are vital to alleviating suffering and building community resilience.
The future of Sudan hinges on whether the foreign powers currently entrenched in its conflict can transition from being contributors to its devastation to being catalysts for its peace. Without a fundamental shift in approach, driven by a commitment to humanitarianism and genuine stability over narrow strategic gains, Sudan risks remaining a prolonged casualty of external interests, its people enduring unimaginable suffering while the world watches.
